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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical framework for valuation, investment decisions, and performance mea-
surement based on a nonstandard theory of residual income. It is derived from the notion of “unrecovered”
capital, which is here named “lost” capital because it represents the capital foregone by the investors. Its
theoretical strength and meaningfulness is shown by deriving it from four main perspectives: financial,
microeconomic, axiomatic, accounting. Implications for asset valuation, capital budgeting and perfor-
mance measurement are investigated. In particular: an aggregation property is shown, which makes
the simple average residual income play a major role in valuation; a dual relation between the standard
theory and the lost-capital theory is proved, clarifying the way periodic performance is computed in the
two paradigms and the rationale for measuring performance with either paradigm; the average account-
ing rate of return is shown to be more reliable than the internal rate of return as a capital budgeting
criterion, and maximization of the average residual income is shown to be equivalent to maximization of
Net Present Value (NPV). Two metrics are also presented: one enjoys the nice property of robust goal
congruence irrespective of the sign of the cash flows; the other one enjoys periodic consistency in the
sense of Egginton (1995). The results obtained suggest that this theory might prove useful for real-life
applications in firm valuation, capital budgeting decision-making, ex ante and ex post performance mea-
surement, incentive compensation. A numerical example illustrates the implementation of the paradigm
to the EVA model and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model.
Keywords. Residual income, valuation, capital budgeting, performance measurement, lost capital, account-
ing rate, average, Economic Value Added.
JEL codes. M41, G11, G12, G31, M21, M52, D46.
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In search of the “lost capital”. A theory for valuation,
investment decisions, performance measurement
1 Introduction
Corporate finance and accounting find a common terrain in the study of the notion of residual income, also
called excess profit or abnormal earnings. Residual income is formally computed as the difference between
the actual income and the counterfactual income investors would receive if they invested their funds at
the opportunity cost of capital. Coined by the General Electric Company, the term first appears in the
literature in Solomons (1965, p. 63), although the same concept, differently labeled, was studied even earlier
(e.g. Preinreich, 1936, 1938; Edwards and Bell, 1961, Bodenhorn, 1964). The contributions of Peasnell (1981,
1982), Peccati (1987, 1989, 1991) and Ohlson (1989, 1995) have caused a renewed interest in this notion
among corporate finance and accounting scholars, with particular regard to firm valuation, performance
measurement, incentive compensation (value-based management). A large number of theoretical and applied
studies have appeared in both applied finance and accounting, (e.g. Stewart, 1991; Ohlson, 1995; Feltham
and Ohlson, 1995; Rappaport, 1998; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001; Young and O’Byrne, 2001; Martin, Petty
and Rich, 2003; Weaver and Weston, 2003; O’Byrne and Young, 2006), and a large number of textbooks
and professional publications in corporate finance, managerial finance and accounting directly deal with the
topic (e.g. Brealey and Myers, 2000; Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 2000; Palepu, Healey and Bernard, 2000;
Grinblatt and Titman, 2002; Revsine, Collins and Johnson, 2005; Arnold, 2005).
It is well-known that there is a lifespan consistency of residual income (RI) with Net Present Value
(NPV): the sum of the discounted residual incomes generated by the project (firm) equals the project’s
NPV (e.g. Peasnell, 1982; Peccati, 1989; Martin and Petty, 2000; Ve´lez-Pareja and Tham, 2003). A line
of research in accounting finance and corporate finance is devoted to exploiting this property for valuation
purposes; it investigates the relations existing between residual income and firm valuation and studies the
opportunity of replacing cash flows with residual incomes in the computation of the market value of a firm
(e.g. Peasnell, 1981, 1982; Ohlson, 1989, 1995; Penman, 1992; O’Hanlon and Peasnell; 2002; Brief, 2007;
Schu¨ler and Krotter, 2008). Residual income is periodic in nature and this makes it a good candidate for
performance measurement. The literature on performance measurement is opulent and is particularly aimed
at providing appropriate performance measures and at devising compensation plans capable of aligning
shareholders’ interests and managers’ interests (e.g. Solomons, 1965; Peccati, 1991; Gallo and Peccati, 1993;
Egginton, 1995; Reichelstein, 1997; Rogerson, 1997; Pfeiffer, 2000; Pfeiffer and Schneider, 2007; Schultze
and Weiler, 2008).
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This paper focusses on the very notion of residual income, aiming at exploring an alternative theory of
residual income, previously introduced by Magni (2000, 2001, 2004, 2005). It is here labelled lost-capital
theory, because its essential feature is the consideration of the capital lost (i.e., foregone) by the investors.
The purpose of this work is just to show how it formally relates to the standard theory.
In order to show the theoretical strength of the new paradigm, this paper presents it in four different ways,
related to four different perspectives: (i) a financial perspective, which generates the lost-capital residual
income from arbitrage theory; (ii) a microeconomic derivation, which focusses on the economic agent’s wealth;
(iii) a mathematical perspective using an axiomatic approach; (iii) an accounting derivation of the paradigm
via two alternative depreciation schedules. This should sufficiently underline the multifaceted theoretical
significance of the residual income, its sound economic meaning, and its formal robustness. The usefulness
of the theory is shown in three main areas:
1. asset valuation: residual incomes aggregate in a value sense, as opposed to the standard paradigm where
residual incomes aggregate in a cash-flow sense. This enables one to compute the firm’s market value
leaving out any consideration about timing, which makes the lost-capital paradigm a good candidate
for firm valuation in real-life applications. The role of the average RI is particularly underlined
2. capital budgeting: a decision rule based on the average accounting rate of return (ARR) is shown to
be superior to the internal-rate-of-return (IRR) rule: no problems of existence or uniqueness arise and,
contrary to the IRR, the rule is equivalent to the NPV rule. The rule may be reframed in terms of
average RI: the latter is shown to be a perfect substitute of the NPV so that maximization of the NPV
may be replaced by maximization of average RI, possibly time-scaled for projects with different life
3. performance measurement: interpretation is given to the different measurement process of the two
theories and, in particular, it is highlighted that the lost-capital theory takes account of the fact that
choice affects not only the return rate, but also the capital invested. The use of the lost-capital residual
income for compensating managers implies that shareholders are willing to reward management on the
basis of the real alternative scenario that would occur if the firm were managed in a value-neutral way.
In other words, the capital charge is a comprehensive one: both return rate and capital are different from
what they would be if the investors chose not to undertake the project. This is revealed by an interesting
dual relation, according to which the two theories are mutually generative. Furthermore, Ferna´ndez’s
(2002) Created Shareholder Value is transformed into the corresponding lost-capital metric. The latter
is a goal-congruent metric, which is more general than Grinyer’s (1985, 1987) Earned Economic Income,
because it is not affected by change in sign of the cash flows. A metric here named maintainable RI
is shown to be periodically consistent in the sense of Egginton (1995). This might prove useful in
performance evaluations given that these metrics directly tie performance to value creation.
Throughout the paper it is assumed that an economic activity f (firm, project) is undertaken at time 0,
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which generates the cash-flow vector ~f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn), ft ∈ R where ft is the cash flow received by the
owners of the asset at time t. The initial investment is f0 > 0 and fn is inclusive of the liquidation value.
The setting is therefore a classical one (with no managerial flexibility)
Cash flows may be thought of as certain or certainty equivalents of random cash flows, which implies that
the discount rate is the risk-free rate. Alternatively, the reader may regard cash flow as expected values:
this is most common in corporate finance (e.g. Brealey and Myers, 2000; Ferna´ndez, 2002; Damodaran,
2005, 2006), accounting (e.g. Peasnell, 1981, 1982; O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 2002; Brief, 2007) and value-
based management (Arnold and Davies, 2000; Martin and Petty, 2000; Young and O’Byrne, 2001). In the
latter case, the cost of capital is a required rate of return taking account of the risk of the enterprise. The
numerical example in the Appendix is consistent with the latter interpretation1 Furthermore, there is no
opening accounting error (as is usual in capital budgeting), that is, the book value at time 0 coincides with
f0, and the theoretical analysis holds either in a proprietary approach (equity value is to be computed) and
an entity approach (firm value is to be computed); thus, the reader may equivalently view the cash-flow
vector ~f as a vector of equity cash flows or as a vector of free cash flows. In the numerical example we use
three amongst the most common discounted-cash-flow techniques to reach the equity value: (i) equity-cash-
flow discounting at the cost of equity, (i) free-cash-flow discounting at the weighted average cost of capital,
(iii) adjusted present value method (see Myers, 1974; Brealey and Myers, 2000; Damodaran, 2005, 2006;
Ferna´ndez, 2002; Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 2000).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows important relations between accounting rates and
book values and interprets accounting rates as internal return rates of one-period projects composing the
economic activity under consideration. It also supplies the classical definition of residual income as currently
in use among finance scholars and accounting scholars. Section 3 is a theoretical presentation of the new
paradigm from four different points of view: they are conventionally labelled: (i) financial (owing to the
arbitrage argument used), (ii) microeconomic (owing to the focus on the economic agent’s wealth and its
evolution through time) (iii) mathematical (given that an axiomatic approach is followed), (iv) accounting
(the residual income is obtained as a difference between depreciation charges). Section 4 draws attention to
an aggregation result whereby time is inessential in valuation: only the sum of residual incomes is of concern
for computing market values. In section 5 an important profitability index is drawn from the lost-capital
framework: the Chisini mean of average of accounting rates is shown to be more general and reliable than the
IRR, and compatible with the NPV. The time-scaled residual income is then introduced, whose maximization
is equivalent to NPV maximization. It is also shown that the impact of income on value is given by the unit
1A discussion on the relation between cost of capital and cash flows is beyond the scope of the paper. A well-written analysis
of the methods to exogenously extract a cost of capital is Armitage’s (2005) book. For various perspectives on the cost of
capital, see Tuttle and Litzenberger (1968), Hamada (1972), Rubinstein (1973), Fama (1977), Lewellen (1977), Weston and
Chen (1980), Haley (1984), Stark (1986), Copeland and Weston (1988), Ohlson (1995), O’Hanlon and Steele (1997), Ruback
(2002); Ogier, Rugman and Spicer (2004), Bøssaerts and Odegaard (2006), Damodaran (2006), Morana (2007), Magni (2009).
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price of a zero-coupon bond (or of an equivalent-risk asset). Section 6 focusses on periodic performance and
the relations between the two paradigms. In particular, a dual relation is shown, according to which standard
residual income may be viewed as a function of lost-capital residual income and viceversa. Furthermore, it
shows that the lost-capital companion of Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value is aligned in sign
with the Net Present Value, that is, robust goal congruence holds (see Mohnen and Bareket, 2007), which
implies that this metric might be particularly interesting for incentive compensation. Whatever the asset
base, the average RI (properly time-scaled if projects have different life), is periodically consistent in the
sense of Egginton (1995) and may be obtained as a residual income where the assets base is specified so that
the average surplus of book value over lost capital is constant through time. Some concluding remarks end
the paper. In the Appendix the conversion process from standard metric to lost-capital metrics is illustrated
for two metrics: the Economic Value Added (Stewart, 1991) and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (Edwards and
Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1995) model. A final illustrative example is also presented.
Main notational conventions are collected in Table 0 at the end of the paper.
2 The standard theory
Consider the cash-flow stream ~f released by asset f (project or firm) and received by the owners of the
asset. Let xt, t = 1, 2, . . . , n be the profit and bt the book value.2 The symbol bn represents book value after
the firm has been liquidated, so bn=0. We assume, unless otherwise specified, that the average book value
b :=
∑n
t=1 bt−1/n is positive. A fundamental accounting identity is
xt = ft − bt−1 + bt t = 1, 2, . . . , n (1)
which is often called clean surplus relation (see Brief and Peasnell, 1996). Letting at be the accounting rate
of return, at = xt/bt−1, clean surplus may be rewritten as
at =
ft + bt
bt−1
− 1 t = 1, 2, . . . , n. (2)
which is well-defined as long as bt−1 6= 0. Equation (2) is highly significant, as is now illustrated. Consider
the vectors et = (~0t−1, 1,~0n−t) ∈ Rn, t, 1, 2, . . . , n where ~0k is the null vector in Rk; consider also the vectors
~ft = −bt−1et+(ft+bt)et+1 ∈ Rn, t = 1, 2, . . . , n. They are interpretable as one-period projects: the investors
invest capital bt−1 at time t− 1 and receive the cash flow ft along with the end-of-period value bt at time t.
We have
~f = ~f1 + ~f2 + . . . ~fn. (3)
Using the clean surplus relation recursively, one easily finds, after some manipulations,
b0 =
n∑
t=1
ft∏t
k=1(1 + ak)
. (4)
2Depending on the perspective, bt is the equity book value or the firm book value (equity+liabilities).
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This means that the vector of accounting rates ~a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) is an internal discount function. This
fact is known in the accounting literature: it has been shown, among others, by Kay (1976), Peasnell (1982),
and Brief and Lawson (1992). However, the straightforward link of this internal discount function with the
notion of internal return vector introduced by Weingartner (1966) is not appreciated. An internal return
vector is a vector ~r = (r1, r2, . . . , rn) of return rates such that
f0 =
n∑
t=1
ft∏t
k=1(1 + rk)
. (5)
The particular case where ~r = (r, r, . . . , r) is just the internal rate of return. Thus, the notion of internal
return vector just generalizes the IRR notion. The link between the internal discount function ~a and the
internal return vector ~r should now be evident from eqs. (4) and (5): if f0 = b0, the vector ~a is an internal
return vector. Reminding that there is no opening accounting error, we have the following
Proposition 1. The accounting rate of return is a one-period IRR, and the internal discount function
generated by the accounting rates is an internal return vector. Also, an IRR is a constant accounting rate
that leads to a zero-NPV project .
The above proposition allows us to assert that the accounting rate of profit is itself an internal rate of return.
Owing to eqs. (2) and (3), the economic activity f may be ideally interpreted as a portfolio of n consecutive
one-period projects ~ft, each of which has an internal rate of return (IRR) equal to at, t = 1, 2, . . . n (see also
Gronchi, 1984, and Manca, 1989, on the splitting up of cash-flow streams). The relation of the (constant)
IRR with the accounting rates has been studied in depth during the last decades. It is widely known in the
literature that it is not possible to obtain the IRR as a meaningful average of accounting rates:
r 6=
∑n
t=1 atbt−1∑n
t=1 bt−1
. (6)
Just because of this fact, the accounting rates are often regarded less significant than the IRR and the above
average is considered unhelpful for analysis and decision-making. However, the average of accounting rates
do lead to the IRR if book values are replaced by their present values computed at IRR:
r =
∑n
t=1 at
bt−1
(1+r)−t∑n
t=1
bt−1
(1+r)−t
(7)
(see Peasnell, 1982; Franks and Hodges, 1984; Peccati, 1989, 1991; Brief and Lawson, 1992).3
Remark 1. It is worth noting that the definition of accounting rate of profit enables one to rewrite the clean
surplus relation as
bt = bt−1(1 + at)− ft (8)
3Note that circularity arises in this relation.
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(see Peasnell, 1982, p. 108). The above relation coincides with the recursion formula used in financial
and actuarial mathematics for computing the balance (residual debt) in a loan contract (Kellison, 1991;
Castagnoli and Peccati, 2002; Promislow, 2006; Werner and Sotskov, 2006), where b0 is the amount borrowed,
atbt−1 represents interest and ft is the installment. This fact enables one to interpret f as a loan contract
whereby shareholders lend the firm the amount b0 and receive the installment ft at time t. In this view,
bt is the residual debt the firm owes the shareholders. The idea of capital as a residual debt is not new:
“The corporation owes the capital, it does not own it. The shareholders own it” (Fetter, 1937, p. 9); and
the corresponding idea of profit as representing shareholders’ interest is also sometimes acknowledged: “the
profit is equal to interest on the capital value existing at the beginning of the period” (Hansen, 1972, p. 15).
The same idea is at the core of Anthony’s (1975) notion of profit.
The standard definition of residual income, universally accepted in accounting and finance, is computed
as a difference between two profits: the actual profit xt and the counterfactual profit that shareholders would
(have) obtain(ed) if they (had) invested b0 in an economic activity whose period rate of return is it, also
known as cost of capital :
xSt = xt − itbt−1 (9)
(S:=standard). Note that three elements are into play: profit, book value, cost of capital. The product itbt−1
is also known as capital charge. From the general framework of (9) different metrics are generated, grounded
on different notions of capital employed (asset side, equity side, economic, accounting, etc.), of cash flows
employed (free cash flow, equity cash flow, capital cash flow4), of internal discount function employed (ROA,
RONA, ROE, etc.).
As anticipated, the clean surplus relation implies a lifespan consistency with the NPV:
NPV =
n∑
t=1
xSt∏t
k=1(1 + ik)
(10)
which holds for any book value depreciation.
3 The lost-capital theory
This section presents a different way of representing the foregone return (the capital charge), and therefore a
different way of interpreting the notion of residual income. It has been originally introduced and investigated
in Magni (2000, 2005, 2006). This section shows that it is possible to derive this notion from four different (but
logically equivalent) arguments: an arbitrage-based argument; an axiomatic approach; an economic argument
focussed on the investor’s wealth; an accounting argument involving alternative depreciation schedules.
4For the notion of capital cash flow, see Ruback (2002) and Ferna´ndez (2002).
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3.1 The financial derivation
Suppose p is a portfolio traded in the market which replicates the cash-flow vector ~f=(f1, f2, . . . , fn). Let
F (s, t) =
∏t
k=s+1(1 + ik) represent the yield term structure, so that F (0, t)
−1 is the unit price of a zero-
coupon bond expiring at t.5 The market value of p is p0 =
∑n
t=1 ftF (0, t)
−1. If p0 6= b0 (i.e. NPV 6=0) the
investor may exploit arbitrage opportunities. For example, assuming (with no loss of generality) p0 > b0,
investors may invest in f , take a short position in p and reinvest the arbitrage gain (p0 − b0) in portfolio
p. The resulting net cash flow will be zero at each date, and investors will receive a net final cash flow Γ,
such that Γ = (p0 − b0)F (0, n)=NPV·F (0, n) (see Table 1). The latter is the accumulated NPV (sometimes
called “excess return” or “net final value”). Let us now measure the periodic gain released by this strategy.
Note that the long and short positions in p may be netted out to result in a net short position (see Table 2).
Let
b∗t = b
∗
t−1(1 + it)− ft (11)
be the value of the short position: the amount xt = at · bt−1 is the profit from the long position, the amount
x∗t = it · b∗t−1 is interest paid on short position and represents the cost paid for undertaking the arbitrage
strategy. The latter also represents the income that shareholders would have earned if they had invested
in portfolio p rather than in firm (project) f . It is then interpretable as a “lost” capital (the same capital
is named “unrecovered” by O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 2002). The periodic gain is given by the difference of
interest on long and short positions:
xLt = xt − x∗t = xt − it · b∗t−1 (12)
(L:=lost-capital). We may also rewrite the latter as
xLt = bt−1(at − i∗t ) (13)
where i∗t := itb
∗
t−1/bt−1. The spread (at− i∗t ) measures the period margin per unit of capital invested. Noting
that b∗n = f0F (0, n)−
∑n−1
t=1 ftF (t, T ) and using the equalities xt = bt−1 − bt + ft and b∗t − b∗t−1 = itb∗t−1 − ft,
one finds that the sequence {xLt }
n
1
of periodic gains decomposes Γ:
xL1 + x
L
2 + . . .+ x
L
n = Γ = NPV · F (0, n). (14)
3.2 The (micro)economic derivation
Consider an economic agent who currently invests funds in an asset yielding profit at a period rate equal to
it, and let W0 be his wealth at time 0. Suppose he has the opportunity of withdrawing the amount f0 (=b0)
5If cash flows are seen as expected values, one only needs consider twin securities instead of zero-coupon bonds, with it being
the one-period expected return rate of the twin security.
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from the asset and investing it in an economic activity, denoted by f . If the investor’s choice is to keep his
funds in the asset, his wealth evolves according to the recursive equation
Wt(~ι) = Wt−1(~ι)(1 + it) (15)
where Wt(~ι) := Wt(i1, i2, . . . , it) so that Wt(~ι) = W0F (0, t). If, instead, he chooses to invest in f , he
periodically receives the amount ft at time t, which he may reinvest in the asset;6 in this case, the investor’s
wealth is composed of activity f and the asset, and the investor’s wealth amounts to
Wt(~b, ~f,~ι) = bt +
(
Wt−1(~b, ~f,~ι)− bt−1
)
(1 + it) + ft (16)
where we set Wt(~b, ~f,~ι) := Wt(b1, . . . , bt, f0, f1, f2, . . . ft, i1, . . . , it). Solving eq. (16) one finds
Wt(~b, ~f,~ι) = bt + (W0 − f0)F (0, t) +
t∑
k=1
fkF (k, t).
This implies that wealth increase, in the latter case, is
Wt(~b, ~f,~ι)−Wt−1(~b, ~f,~ι) = xt + it
(
(W0 − f0)F (0, t−1) +
t−1∑
k=1
fkF (k, t−1)
)
,
whereas wealth increase in the opposite case (i.e., leaving funds in the asset) is
Wt(~ι)−Wt−1(~ι) = itW0F (0, t−1).
Therefore, the excess increase in wealth is given by the difference of the alternative wealth increases:
excess wealth increase in period (t−1, t) = (Wt(xt,~ι)−Wt−1(xt,~ι))− (Wt(~ι)−Wt−1(~ι))
= xt − itf0F (0, t−1) + it
t−1∑
k=1
fkF (k, t−1).
(17)
But
itf0F (0, t−1)− it
t−1∑
k=1
fkF (k, t−1) = it · b∗t−1 = i∗t · bt−1,
so that eq. (17) becomes
excess wealth increase in period (t−1, t) = xt − i∗t · bt−1 = xLt . (18)
It is worth noting that we have found xLt by making use of two alternative hypotheses about the evolution
of the investor’s wealth, namely the two dynamic systems in eq. (15) and eq. (16).
6Note that this is just the standard assumption of the NPV rule.
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We may ideally part the investor’s wealth into two assets in both cases:
Wt−1(~b, ~f,~ι) =
economic activity with return rate at︷︸︸︷
bt−1 +
asset with return rate it︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Wt−1(~b, ~f,~ι)− bt−1)
)
(19)
Wt−1(~ι) =
asset with return rate it︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Wt−1(~ι)−Wt−1(~b, ~f,~ι) + bt−1) +
asset with return rate it︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Wt−1(~b, ~f,~ι)− bt−1
)
. (20)
The differential return between the two alternatives is not dependent on the second addend, which is shared
by both alternatives; it may therefore be dismissed and, applying the corresponding rates of return to the
first addends, one finds
excess wealth increase in period (t−1, t) = at · bt−1 − it · (Wt−1(~ι)−Wt−1(~b, ~f,~ι) + bt−1).
It is easy to see that
Wt−1(~ι)−Wt−1(~b, ~f,~ι) = bt−1 − b∗t−1, (21)
so one finds back
excess wealth increase in period (t−1, t) = xtbt−1 − it · b∗t−1 = xtbt−1 − i∗t · bt−1 = xLt .
3.3 The axiomatic derivation
This section derives both the standard (S) and the lost-capital (L) residual income by a simple axiomatic
approach. We begin by giving a most general definition of residual income.
Definition 1. Residual income is income in excess of a capital charge Ct ∈ R: that is, RIt = xt − Ct.
Let RIt denote residual income in the period from t−1 to t. To prevent the above definition to be excessively
lax and thus unhelpful, a first natural requirement is that RIt be linked to the notion of NPV. As a most
general property, we require that some discounting process of all residual incomes should lead to the NPV.
Property 1. (npv-consistency) There exists a vector ~σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) ∈ Nn such that
n∑
t=1
RIt
(1 + i1)(1 + i2) · · · (1 + iσt)
= NPV. (22)
Now, referring to section 3.2 above, it is worth noting that the investor’s wealth increase generated in the
span [0, t] is given by [Wt(~b, ~f,~ι)−W0] if investors undertake firm f , and by [Wt(~ι)−W0] if they invest funds
at the opportunity cost of capital it. The corresponding excess wealth increase generated in the span [0, t]
is then
I0,t =
[
Wt(~b, ~f,~ι)−W0
]− [Wt(~ι)−W0].
Thus, a second, rather natural, condition is that the sum of all past t residual incomes should equal the
investor’s excess wealth increase I0.t. In formal terms, additive coherence is required:
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Axiom 1. (Additive coherence) The sum of the first t residual incomes is equal to excess wealth increase
generated in the span [0, t]:
t∑
j=1
RIj = I0,t for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n. (23)
Proposition 2. Definition 1 and Axiom 1 imply that the capital charge is Ct = i∗t · bt−1. The corresponding
residual income is npv-consistent, with ~σ = (n, n, . . . , n).
Proof. Definition 1 is formally represented as RIt = xt − Ct, and Axiom 1 implies RIt = I0,t − I0,t−1. Thus,
xt − Ct = I0,t − I0,t−1. But I0,t − I0,t−1=bt − b∗t − bt−1 + b∗t−1. Reminding that xt − ft = bt − bt−1 and
it ·b∗t−1−ft = b∗t −b∗t−1, one gets to Ct = it ·b∗t−1 = i∗t ·bt−1. Property 1 is fulfilled by picking ~σ = (n, n, , . . . , n),
given that
n∑
t=1
RIt
(1 + i1) · · · (1 + in) =
∑n
t=1(xt − i∗t bt−1)
(1 + i1) · · · (1 + in) =
NPV · F (0, n)
(1 + i1) · · · (1 + in) = NPV
(see equation (14)).
Proposition 2 shows that, given the general framework of Definition 1, the L residual income is generated
if additive coherence is required. Note that Axiom 1 requires residual income to be aggregated in a value
sense. If, instead, aggregation is required in a cash-flow sense, the S paradigm is generated, as is now shown.
Axiom 1’. (Adjusted additive coherence) The capitalised sum of the first t residual incomes is equal to
excess wealth increase generated in the first t periods:
t∑
j=1
RIj · F (j, t) = I0,t for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n. (24)
Proposition 3. Definition 1 and Axiom 1’ imply that the capital charge is Ct = itbt−1. The corresponding
residual income is npv-consistent, with ~σ = (1, 2, . . . , n).
Proof. Definition 1 implies RIt = xt − Ct and Axiom 1’ implies RIt = I0,t − (1 + it)I0,t−1. Thus, xt − Ct =
I0,t − (1 + it)I0,t−1. Using the equalities I0,t − I0,t−1=bt − b∗t − bt−1 + b∗t−1 and b∗t = b∗t−1(1 + it)− ft one gets
to Ct = itbt−1; npv-consistency derives from clean surplus by choosing ~σ = (1, 2, . . . , n).
The S residual income and the L residual income are then particular cases of a general residual-income
framework individuated by Definition 1 and Property 1 (see Table 3).
3.4 The accounting derivation
In an important work on residual income, Egginton (1995) investigates seven different ways of calculating a
depreciation charge: annuity depreciation, IRR depreciation, equivalent replacement cost depreciation, de-
preciation of maintainable RI, lease charge, straight line depreciation, and Adjusted RI. For each depreciation
schedule, the author computes the corresponding residual income, such that xSt = ft−Dept(bt−1, bt)− itbt−1,
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where Dept(bt−1, bt):=bt−1 − bt. The Adjusted RI, which is actually identical to Anthony’s (1975) notion of
profit,7 has the particular feature that Dept(bt−1, bt) = bt−1 − bt = ft − itbt−1 (see Egginton, 1995, eq. (9) at
p. 210). But this is just the recurrence equation for the lost capital (see eq. (11) above). In other words,
Egginton implicitly chooses bt = b∗t = b0F (0, t) −
∑t−1
j=1 fjF (j, t−1), so that Dept(bt−1, bt)=Dept(b∗t−1, b∗t ).
This means that the Adjusted RI is computed as xSt = ft − Dept(b∗t−1, b∗t ) − itb∗t−1. Note that the capital
charge of the Adjusted RI is just the capital charge of the lost-capital theory Ct = itb∗t−1. Now, if we subtract
any depreciation charge from the depreciation charge of the Adjusted RI we obtain the L residual-income
framework:
Dept(b
∗
t−1, b
∗
t )−Dept(bt−1, bt) = (b∗t−1 − b∗t )− (bt−1 − bt) = (ft − itb∗t−1)− (ft − atbt−1) = xt − itb∗t−1 = xLt .
The accounting meaning of the L theory in terms of depreciation is now enlightening. The depreciation
for Adjusted RI serves as a benchmark to reflect the market-determined decline in the asset’s value. If the
asset’s decline in value determined by the market is greater than the decline in value determined by the
accounting policy, then performance is positive.
It is worth noting that the Adjusted RI is the only RI metric that the two theories share. Indeed, xLt = x
S
t
for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n if and only if the two capital charges coincide: itb∗t−1 = itbt−1 for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n.
This implies bt−1 = b∗t−1 for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n, which means that the residual income is just the Adjusted
RI. Therefore, the Adjusted RI is, at the same time, a standard RI and a lost-capital RI. Therefore, the
depreciation charge of Egginton’s Adjusted RI plays a prominent role in the L theory. We finally highlight
the fact that the capital charge i∗t bt−1 of the L theory is equal to the sum of the project’s cash flow at time
t and the depreciation of the Adjusted RI: i∗t bt−1 = ft + Dept(b
∗
t−1, b
∗
t ).
4 Implications for valuation
Residual income has been used for firm and project valuation long since: Carsberg (1966) testifies of dis-
counting procedures involving excess profits rather than cash flows: among others, the author emphasizes
Leake’s (1921) contribution to valuation of Goodwill, obtained by discounting the surplus of profit over a
normal return on capital. In later years, Preinreich (1936, 1938) hints at the capital value obtained as the
sum of book values plus the discounted excess profits. The formal link between DCF valuation and residual
income is made more explicit by Lu¨cke (1955), Edey (1957) and Edwards and Bell (1961). Bodenhorn (1964)
acknowledges that the sum of discounted residual incomes (which he calls “pure earnings”) is equal to the
NPV regardless of the depreciation pattern. In recent years, Peasnell (1981, 1982), Peccati (1987, 1989),
Ohlson (1989, 1995), Gallo and Peccati (1993) adopt a more formal treatment.
As seen, the L residual income is npv-consistent as required by Property 1, but it is worth underlining
7See also Tomkins, 1973.
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that such a consistency is independent of the asset base. Using xt = ft + (bt − bt−1), one may write
NPV = F (0, n)−1
n∑
t=1
[xt − itb∗t−1] = F (0, n)−1[
n∑
t=1
ft − f0 −
n∑
t=1
itb
∗
t−1].
Therefore, the discounted sum of the L residual incomes is a constant function with respect to book values:
∂
∂b1
NPV =
∂
∂b2
NPV = . . . =
∂
∂bn
NPV = 0
for all bt ∈ R.
The independence from book values makes L residual income an appropriate valuation tool; however, the
two theories lead to the firm’s market value with opposite procedures: theory S requires a discount-then-sum
mechanism, while theory L requires a sum-then-discount approach. That is,
xS1
F (0, 1)
+
xS2
F (0, 2)
+ . . .+
xSn
F (0, n)
= NPV
whereas
NPV = (xL1 + x
L
2 + . . .+ x
L
n)
1
F (0, n)
. (25)
Thus, in the S theories RIs are computationally treated as cash flows, whereas in the L theory RIs are treated
as values: they are summed as values referred to time n, and their aggregation determines the accumulated
NPV; once this value is discounted back to time 0, the net present value is obtained. The L paradigm
then provides a powerful result of income aggregation: the grand total residual income (i.e., the grand total
income minus the grand total capital charge) exactly matches the accumulated NPV. This reflects what
Penman calls the ”aggregation property of accounting” (Penman, 1992, p. 237). Implications for valuation
are summarised in the following
Proposition 4. Consider any sequence ~k = (k1, k2 . . . , kn) ∈ Rn such that
n∑
t=1
kt =
n∑
t=1
xLt . (26)
Then, the market value of the firm is given by
v0 = b0 + (k1 + k2 + . . .+ kn)
1
F (0, n)
. (27)
Proof. Straightforward from the assumption, eq. (26) and the equality v0=NPV+b0.
This result implies that the L paradigm tends to offset errors in valuation: one does not have to worry about
forecasting each and every residual income and imputing it to the correct period, because only the grand
total counts.
In particular, we have the following relevant case:
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Corollary 1. Let ~k = (k, k, . . . , k) be a sequence of residual incomes fulfilling condition (26). Then,
v0 = b0 + nk · [F (0, n)]−1 . (28)
It is worth noting that the simple arithmetic mean of residual incomes xL =
∑n
t=1 x
L
t /n satisfies the as-
sumptions of Corollary 1, which implies
v0 = b0 + nxL · [F (0, n)]−1 . (29)
Therefore, we have proved the following important
Proposition 5. The value of a firm is a linear affine function of the simple arithmetic mean of L residual
incomes.
A practical consequence is that NPV may be calculated with no recourse to cash flows: one only needs
forecast the average RI, or, equivalently, the average income and the average capital charge. Given the
considerable amount of historic accounting data available to the investors, it may be easier, in some cases,
to determine the average RI than each and every cash flow. Graham, Dodd, and Cottle’s (1962) words fit
particularly well in this context:
The most important single factor determining a stock’s value is now held to be the indicated average
future earning power, i.e., the estimated average earnings for a future span of years. Intrinsic value
would then be found by first forecasting this earning power and then multiplying that prediction by an
appropriate ‘capitalization factor’” Graham, Dodd, and Cottle (1962, p. 28).
Equation (29) puts the above qualitative statement on a solid quantitative footing: once adjusted the
average earnings with the capital charge, they are multiplied by the proper capitalization factor, which is,
n [F (0, n)]−1. Hence, the L theory seems to be a reliable tool for making project and firm evaluation.
5 Implications for capital budgeting
The shortcomings of using ARRs in place of economic rates of return has been the focus of several decades of
academic research (e.g. Harcourt, 1965; Solomon, 1966; Kay, 1976; Peasnell, 1982; Brief and Lawson, 1992).
Contrary to the IRR and the NPV, accounting measures are usually considered of little help for making
capital budgeting decisions, because “it is widely presumed in the accounting and economic literatures that,
for the most part in practice, ARRs are artifacts without economic significance” (Peasnell, 1982, p. 368)
and the idea of comparing accounting rates of return with the cost of capital is “clearly like comparing
apples with oranges” (Rappaport, 1986, p. 31). Likewise, neither income maximization nor residual income
maximization is equivalent to NPV maximization (but see Anctil, 1996; Anctil, Jordan and Mukherji, 1998),
which implies that accounting measures may not be used for project selection.
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Opposing this view, this section shows that the L theory enables one to give a significant interpretation
of the (weighted) average of accounting rates and that maximization of a simple average residual income is
equivalent to maximization of NPV. As we have seen, the NPV is obtained as
NPV = F (0, n)−1
n∑
t=1
xLt = F (0, n)
−1
n∑
t=1
(xt − i∗t · bt−1) = F (0, n)−1
n∑
t=1
(at − i∗t )bt−1.
Now, applying the notion of Chisini mean (see Chisini, 1929; Graziani and Veronese, 2009), we search for a
constant rate a such that
F (0, n)−1
n∑
t=1
(at − i∗t )bt−1 = F (0, n)−1
n∑
t=1
(a− i∗t )bt−1. (30)
One finds
a =
∑n
t=1 atbt−1∑n
t=1 bt−1
. (31)
Unlike the IRR, its existence and uniqueness is guaranteed owing to the linearity of the equations, it is not
circular and does not depend on costs of capital.
Now we prove that this Chisini mean may replace the IRR for accept/reject decisions:
Proposition 6. Project f is worth undertaking if and only if the average accounting rate is greater than the
average comprehensive cost of capital:
a > ι∗ (32)
where ι∗ :=
∑n
t=1 i
∗
t bt−1∑n
t=1 bt−1
.
Proof. Just consider that a > ι∗ if and only if
∑n
t=1 bt−1(a−~ι∗) =
∑n
t=1 bt−1(at− i∗t ) > 0, which is equivalent
to NPV> 0.8
Note that a essentially represents the average income per unit of capital invested and (a− ι∗) essentially
measures the average RI per unit of capital invested. Eq. (32) states that a project is profitable if such
a residual income is positive. Let g := a − ι∗. We have g = g(b1, b2, . . . bN−1). It is easy to see that
∂
∂bt
g(b1, b2, . . . bn−1) is not identically zero for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n and for all bt ∈ R. This means that the
per-unit average RI changes if book value changes. However, for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n and for all bt ∈ R,
either g(b1, b2, . . . bn−1) > 0 or g(b1, b2, . . . bn−1) < 0. This stems from the fact that g(b1, b2, . . . bN−1) =∑n
t=1(xt−itb∗t−1)∑n
t=1 bt−1
= −f0+
∑n
t=1(ft−itb∗t−1)∑n
t=1 bt−1
. The denominator is positive by assumption, so the sign of g depends
on the numerator, which is a constant. Hence, the ARR rule above stated is robust under changes in the
depreciation pattern: it holds for any book value depreciation.
Evidently, this rule is more reliable that the IRR rule, given that the latter is not necessarily compatible
with the NPV rule.9 The shortcomings of the IRR rule for ranking projects are also well-known. The IRR
8If
∑n
t=1 bt−1 < 0, the ARR rule still holds with the sign reversed.
9The IRR rule may be incompatible with the NPV rule even if the IRR is unique: this occurs whenever the NPV graph lies
below the horizontal axis for all rates except in one point, where the graph is tangent to the horizontal axis.
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rule suggests to undertake the project with the highest IRR or, equivalently, the project with the highest
margin r − i. By contrast, the ARR rule suggests to undertake the project with the highest margin a− ι∗.
This is equivalent to NPV maximization. To show it, we only note that the average ARR is invariant under
changes in book value if the average book value b remains unchanged. Given that one may always choose
depreciation patterns such that the average book values of the projects coincide (even if they have different
life), we have the following
Proposition 7. Consider a set of projects j whose length is nj, j = 2, . . . ,K. If book value depreciations
are chosen so that the sum of book values coincide for all projects, maximization of the margin a − ι∗ is
equivalent to NPV maximization.
Proof. The equality
∑nj
t=1 bj,t−1 =
∑nk
t=1 bk,t−1 for j, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K implies that the problem max1≤j≤K
NPV= max1≤j≤K
∑nj
t=1 bj,t−1(aj − ι∗j ) is equivalent to max1≤j≤K(aj − ι∗j ).
Practically, one may for example consider the outlay f j0 of project j, and consider the following depreciation
schedules: bk,1 = bj,0 − bk,0, bk,t = 0 for t > 1 and for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. This implies that the total
book value for all projects is
∑nk
t=1 bk,t = bj,0 for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Then, the corresponding margins are
computed and the projects are correctly ranked.10
Not only is the sign of g(·) invariant under changes in book values; it is easy to show that the average
residual income xL is independent of book values, because we may rewrite it as xL = (−f0 +
∑n
t=1(ft −
itb
∗
t−1))/n, where book values bt do not appear. This striking result means that the simple arithmetic mean
of RIs may replace the NPV for capital budgeting valuation and decision. In particular, considering that
NPV = (nF (0, n)−1) · xL we have, for K projects of equal life, max1≤j≤K NPVj = max1≤j≤K xLj , where the
subscript j refers to project j=1, 2, . . . ,K. This means that the (average) RI ranking is equivalent to the
NPV ranking.
The L arithmetic mean of RI is then a perfect substitute of the NPV when decision makers deal with
projects of equal life, because it correctly signals value creation. Evidently, this result does not hold in the
S theory. As a simple counterexample, consider n=5, ~f = (260, 460, 220, 80, 290), f0=1000, it = 0.1 for
all t. We have NPV=16.53 > 0 and the sequence of residual incomes is (60, 170,−150,−60,−40) in the S
paradigm and (60, 176,−126,−49,−34) in the L paradigm. The simple arithmetic means are xS = −4 < 0
and xL = 5.4 > 0 respectively. The S paradigm erroneously signals value destruction.
More generally, consider project j, j = 1, 2, . . . ,K, and let nj be its length. Denoting with Z :=
max1≤j≤K nj the maximum length, we may scale the project’s length by considering the ratio nj/Z, and
construct the time-scaled residual income αjxLj , where αj = (nj/Z)F (nj , Z). In this way, all projects may be
10It is easily seen that the classical rule proposed by Teichroew, Robichek and Montalbano (1965) for accept/reject decision
is only is only a particular case of the ARR rule where the book value depreciation is chosen such that bt = bt−1(1 + at)− ft,
where at = i if bt−1 < 0 or at = k, k > −1, if bt−1 > 0. But the rule proposed by these authors is not compatible with the NPV
for project ranking.
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considered of the same length (=Z), and maximization of the time-scaled RI is equivalent of maximization of
NPV, given that NPV1 >NPV2 if and only if α1xL1 > α2x
L
2 . The ranking of projects may thus be grounded
on the average RI or on its time-scaled version. We have then the following
Proposition 8. Maximization of average RI (or time-scaled RI) is equivalent to NPV maximization.
The above proposition says that maximization of the average residual income is equivalent to maximization
of NPV even for unequal-life projects, provided the average RIs is adjusted to take account of the different
lifespan.
Remark 2. The time-scaled RI is a constant residual income which is scaled in order to account for the
project life. Viceversa, the average RI may be defined as the accumulated NPV per unit of length:
xL =
NPV
n
F (0, n).
Because xL =
∑n
t=1 bt−1(a− ι)/n, the relation between NPV and accounting rates is significant:
a = ι+ λ (33)
with λ := NPV·F (0,n)∑n
t=1 bt−1
. Thus, the accounting rate is the sum of the average comprehensive cost of capital
and the ratio of accumulated NPV to the grand total capital invested. Hence, the ARR is decomposed into
two parts: the first one represents interest foregone, the second one represents the accumulated NPV per
unit of total capital invested. And the latter is just the average residual income per unit of capital invested:
λ = xLt /b where b :=
∑n
t=1 bt−1/n is the average capital invested in a period.
Remark 3. An interesting relation between income and asset prices may be provided. Note that the value
of any t-period asset may be written as a function of incomes:
vt0(x1, x2, . . . , xt) = b0 + F (0, t)
−1(
t∑
j=1
xj −
t∑
j=1
i∗j bj−1).
Hence, ∂vt0/∂xk = F (0, t)
−1 for all k = 1, 2, . . . , t and all (x1, x2, . . . , xt) ∈ Rt. This means that the impact of
income on an asset is market-determined and, in particular, the market value of an additional euro available
at time t is equal to the increase in value due to a unit income increase occurred in any period. In other
words, to increase an investor’s wealth by a euro at time t is financially equivalent to increasing income by a
euro in the interval [0, t]. We stress that the equivalence holds no matter when the income increase occurs:
it may be distributed in various ways over the span [0, t]. This enables one to write the value of any n-year
asset as a linear combination:
vn0 = f1
∂v10
∂xk1
+ f2
∂v20
∂xk2
+ . . . fn
∂vn0
∂xkn
(34)
where kj , is an arbitrary natural number between 1 and j, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. In other words, the derivatives of
values with respect to income represent a system of unit prices: in case it is the risk-free rate, they describe
the yield term structure.
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6 Implications for performance measurement
6.1 A dual relation
Since Solomons’s (1965) classical book, the notion of residual income has often been advocated as a measure of
performance and as a tool for incentive compensation. The literature has grown dramatically since. Among
many others, a special mention should be devoted to Rogerson’s (1997) contribution regarding incentive
compensation: the author copes with the situation where the principal delegates decisions on investment
level to the agent who is better informed about the investment opportunities. The agent is assumed to
be impatient and aims at maximizing a utility function which depends on RI via a reward contract that
linearly links residual income to wages. Assuming positive operating cash flows governed by a specified
stochastic path (of which only the distributional parameters are known to the principal), the author shows
that there is a unique allocation rule (and thus a unique depreciation schedule), called the “Relative Marginal
Benefit” rule, which is optimal in the sense that it maximizes both the principal’s expected NPV and the
manager’s utility function. Reichelstein’s (1997) paper shows that residual income in combination with
Relative Marginal Benefit allocation rule is the unique linear performance metric that achieves strong goal
congruence in this context (see also Bromwich and Walker, 1998). Under the same information structure
of Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (1997), Mohnen (2003) and Mohnen and Bareket (2007) show that
the Relative Marginal Benefit allocation rule is not optimal if exogenous capital constraints (or mutually
exclusive projects) are introduced in the decision problem. Other significant contributions in this vein are
Mohnen (2003), Mohnen and Bareket (2007), Pfeiffer and Velthuis (2009), Baldenius, Dutta, and Reichelstein
(2006). Baldenius and Reichelstein (2005) examine efficient inventory management from an incentive and
control perspective; Schultze and Weiler (2008) devise a bonus bank system where an internal market is
created; the quitting manager may sell the bonus bank to the entering manager. The authors show that if
the purchase price for the bonus bank is computed with the Nash bargaining solution, the quitting manager
will choose the optimal investment level and will have no incentive to overstate value creation in his reporting.
Grinyer and Walker (1990) and Stark (2000) take a dynamic perspective on investment decision-making: they
focus on real-option frameworks where there is some flexibility for subsequent decisions; the authors find
that a residual income-type performance measure can be designed which supports optimal investment and
disinvestment decisions. Friedl (2007) analyses residual income as a performance measure for investments
in flexible manufacturing systems showing the occurrence of underinvestment if residual income is used in
a standard way, and providing some adjustment to achieve goal congruence. He also shows that, under the
assumption of an existing waiting option, investment will be undertaken too early, unless proper adjustment
is made to guarantee goal congruence (see also Antle, Bogetoft and Stark, 2001, 2007; Arya and Glover, 2001;
Friedl, 2005). In applied corporate finance, the quest for an appropriate performance measure has triggered
the popularization of many metrics, especially in the value-based management literature (see Stewart, 1991;
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Madden, 1999; Martin and Petty, 2000; Young and O’Byrne, 2001; Ferna´ndez, 2002; Martin, Petty and Rich,
2003; Fabozzi and Grant, 2000).
This section aims at illustrating the formal relations between the S residual income and the L residual
income. This analysis may contribute to a better understanding of the way the L residual income works and
hopefully arouse interest among management accounting scholars for possible use in incentive compensation
as well as ex-post (and ex-ante) performance measurement.
We then ask: if performance is measured by the L paradigm instead of the S paradigm, what is the
discrepancy? Will the measure be greater or smaller? Will the two paradigms signal positive and negative
performance in the same periods? The following proposition provides some hints.
Proposition 9. The spread between L residual income and S residual income is given by the compounded
value of past standard residual income
xLt − xSt = it
t−1∑
k=1
xSkF (k, t− 1) t ≥ 1 (35)
where we set
∑0
k=1 fkF (k, 0) := 0.
Proof. Since b∗t = b0F (0, t− 1)−
∑t−1
k=1 fkF (k, t− 1) and fk = bk−1(1 + ak)− bk, we have
b∗t−1 = b0F (0, t− 1)−
t−1∑
k=1
[bk−1(1 + ak)− bk]F (k, t− 1).
Upon rearranging terms, we find
bt−1 − b∗t−1 =
t−1∑
k=1
bk−1(ak − ik)F (k, t− 1) (36)
=
t−1∑
k=1
xSkF (k, t− 1). (37)
Consequently, it
∑t−1
k=1 x
S
kF (k, t − 1) = it(bt−1 − b∗t−1), so that the thesis is proved, given that xLt − xSt =
it(bt−1 − b∗t−1).
The term it(bt−1− b∗t−1) reveals the formal nature of the conceptual difference between the two paradigms. It
represents the interest on the excess capital invested (bt−1 − b∗t−1): as seen, the L paradigm is concerned not
only with the interest rate that could have been exploited by the investor, but also with the capital to which
that interest rate could be applied. Thus, while at > it signals positive performance in the S paradigm,
because it implies xSt > 0 (as long as book value is positive), the capital lost by the investor may be greater
than the actual capital invested (i.e b∗t−1 > bt−1), so that the L excess profit may signal a smaller performance
with respect to the S paradigm’s: the interest that could have been yielded by the surplus of capital may be
so great as to offset the positive effect of the ARR: whenever 0 < xSt < it[b
∗
t−1 − bt−1], one gets xLt < 0 < xSt ,
19
which informs that a negative performance is measured by the L paradigm. The additional component may
symmetrically act as a sort of insurance bonus: if at < it, performance may still be regarded positive in the
L paradigm if b∗t−1 < bt−1, which means that past performance has been so positive that the actual capital
invested is greater than the capital lost by investors, and that the fact that the accounting rate is smaller
than the cost of capital is more than compensated by the greater basis to which the accounting rates is
applied: atbt−1 > itb∗t−1.
To signal positive performance, the ARR must be greater than the comprehensive cost of capital i∗t by
an additional term: we have
i∗t = it + it
b∗t−1 − bt−1
bt−1
The second addend in the right-hand side is the product of the cost of capital and the relative increase
(decrease) in capital due to acceptance of the project. For example, suppose it=0.1, bt−1=80, b∗t−1=100; then,
if project had been rejected, the capital invested would be higher than the the actual capital employed; in
particular, it would be higher by a 25%=(100−80)/80. This means that investors could have invested a
25% more capital than they actually invest, and they could have earned a 10% on that 25%, so that an
additional 2.5% would accrue to them. Therefore, for a positive performance to occur, the ARR must be
greater than 10%; in particular, the threshold level is i∗=12.5%=10%+2.5%. In general, the required cutoff
rate i∗t may be greater, equal or smaller than the cost of capital it. The latter case occurs whenever the
additional-interest component is negative, which means that the actual capital bt−1 exceeds the lost capital
b∗t−1 and therefore the investor forego (not a return but) a cost. To summarise: the S residual income tells
us that, if the accounting rate at is greater than the cost of capital it, then a positive performance occurs;
however, if at is greater than it but, at the same time, the basis to which at is applied is different (smaller or
greater), then the final effect cannot be a priori established: return rate and capital are both fundamental
elements to take account of in the capital charge.
The following proposition shows that either paradigm can be generated by the other.
Proposition 10. Theory S and theory L are mutually generative. In particular,
xLt = x
S
t + it
t−1∑
k=1
xSkF (k, t− 1) t ≥ 1 (38)
and
xSt = x
L
t − it
t−1∑
k=1
xLk t ≥ 1 (39)
where we set
∑0
k=1 x
S
kF (k, t− 1) =
∑0
k=1 x
L
k := 0.
Proof. Equation (38) is just eq. (35). To prove eq. (39) one just has to prove that
t−1∑
k=1
xLk =
t−1∑
k=1
xSkF (k, t− 1).
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Noting that xS1 = x
L
1 , the latter equality is derived by induction.
Corollary 2. The surplus of capital bt−1− b∗t−1 invested in the t-period is either a function of past S residual
incomes and a function of past L residual incomes:
bt−1 − b∗t−1 =
t−1∑
k=1
xSkF (k, t− 1) (40)
bt−1 − b∗t−1 =
t−1∑
k=1
xLk (41)
Proof. Use
∑t−1
k=1 x
L
k =
∑t−1
k=1 x
S
kF (k, t− 1) and eq. (37).
Both paradigms may then be interpreted as providing performance measures that depend on the past per-
formance measures of the alternative paradigms; this fact hints at a dual theory of residual income. For
example, form the point of view of a standard-looking evaluator the L theory may be interpreted as an
accumulation system of standard residual incomes. Positive (negative) performances will positively (neg-
atively) reverberate in the following periods, so tending to increase (decrease) xLt with respect to x
S
t . If
performance is good in one year according to the S theory, next-year L residual income will be positively
affected regardless of whether at is greater or smaller than it. For example, if it should happen that at < it
in some period, then, although xSt < 0, the L residual income benefits from the second addend of eq. (38),
which acts as an insurance bonus. If, instead, at > it, the insurance part become an additional return.
Evidently, the additional term works well if b∗t−1 < bt−1. But this just depends on the past performances. If it
occurs that b∗t−1 > bt−1, the additional term is negative, which tends to lower residual income even if at > it.
Again, this depends on the past performances. Symmetrically, the S paradigm is obtained as the current
L residual income minus a charge given by the past L residual incomes, and positive (negative) lost-capital
past performances negatively (positively) reverberate on current S residual incomes.
Remark 4. In terms of management compensation, the efficacy of the L paradigm as opposed to the S
paradigm also depends on the type of compensation plan selected. For example there are at least three
ways of using a metric: the historical use, according to which the manager’s bonus is a share of the residual
income:
bonus = α% RI;
an αβ compensation plan, according to which bonus is tied to residual income variation:
bonus = α% RI + β% ∆ RI;
and the excess residual-income improvement plan, according to which the expected residual-income improve-
ment (EI) plays a major role:
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bonus = target bonus +β% (∆ RI−EI)
(see Young and O’Byrne, 2001). For positive-residual-income companies using either the historical plan or
an αβ plan, we can say that the manager’s bonuses computed with the lost-capital paradigm are greater
than the ones computed in the standard paradigm, because in the former both RI and ∆ RI are greater than
the corresponding ones in the latter (proof is straightforward using eqs. (38) and (39)). However, things are
complicated by the fact that comparisons may be made along two dimensions: the type of metric selected
and the paradigm chosen. That is, a metric in a paradigm may be compared with the same metric in the
alternative paradigm, or with an alternative metric in the same paradigm, or with an alternative metric in
the alternative paradigm. Having two paradigms and a wide set of metrics it may be the case that a metric
in one paradigm is more incentive than a different metric in the alternative paradigm.
Remark 5. Compensating managers with the S residual income boils down to forgetting that choice affects
capital. To invest funds at a determined rate of return makes capital change in time. This implies in turn
that managers’ compensation is not entirely tied to the alternative return stemming from the choice of
investing at the rate it. An example may be of some help. Two firms, A and B, are incorporated with
10000 euros each and managers are compensated on the basis of the standard residual income. Firm A’s
managers use the amount to purchase a piece of land. The land is sold after three years at a price of 12947
and there is no intermediate cash flow. Suppose the book value is b0 = 10000, b1=10700, b2 =11770. Firm
B’s managers purchase a piece of land in a different place and sell the land after three years at a price of
13310 (with no intermediate cash flow). Assume firm B’s book values are b0 = 10000, b1=11000, b2 =12100.
Hence, incomes are 700, 1070, 1177 in firm A and 1000, 1100, 1210 in firm B. Assuming a cost of capital
equal to 10% in all periods, firm B’s residual incomes are zero in each period, because the firm just replicates
a financial investment with a 10% return; in other words, managers of firm B behave in a value-neutral
way. The RIs in firm A are zero in the second and third period, but in the first period RI is equal to
700 − 0.1 · 10000 = −300. The difference between the two firms lies in the first period performance: firm
A’s managers employ funds at a 7% (10700/10000−1), firm B’s managers invests funds at 10% on the same
capital (11000/10000−1). However, in the second period, while in both firms funds are employed at 10%,
firm B’s shareholders can benefit from investing a greater capital (11000>10700), which has been created
thanks to a better performance in the first period. Firm A’s shareholders then lose (i.e., forego) 300 euros
capital with respect to the shareholders of firm B, and thus forego a 30 euros return (=0.1· 300) in the second
period. This negative performance reverberates in the third period as well: firm A’s shareholders lose 330
euros (=300+30) capital with respect to firm B’s, and so they forego a 33 return (=0.1·330). These figures
(−30 and −33) are just the L residual incomes of firm A in the second and third year respectively. That is,
contrary to the S residual income, the L theory ties (performance and) reward to the real alternative income
that would have been generated in each period if funds were invested at the cost of capital. Shareholders of
firm B then better off than shareholders of firm A not only in the first period, but in the second and third
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period as well. The use of the L paradigm in compensation plans means that managers are rewarded by
taking account not only what the return rate would be, but also what the capital would be if they acted in
a value-neutral way.
6.2 Goal-congruence and periodic consistency
If residual income is aligned in sign with the NPV in each period, then it is said to enjoy goal congruence; if,
in addition, goal congruence is such that the RI ranking of projects provides in each period the same ranking
as the NPV, then robust goal congruence holds (see Reichelstein, 1997; Mohnen and Bareket, 2007). In order
to align managers’ behaviors to shareholders’ objectives, compensation should be tied to value creation, that
is, to the NPV. A mystifying problem in value-based management is just that RI is not, in general, goal
congruent. To circumvent the problem, a possible route is to make some adjustments to residual income
itself or to devise compensation plans so as to tie residual income to value creation (Ehrbar, 1998; Stewart,
1991; O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 2000; Young and O’Byrne, 2001; Martin, Petty and Rich, 2003). Grinyer
(1985, 1987) proposes an index labelled Earned Economic Income, which has the goal congruence property,
given that it is aligned with the Net Present Value. This index is exactly equal to the above-mentioned
Rogerson’s (1997) metric. However, such a metric is equal in sign to the NPV only if the project’s cash flows
are all of the same sign (Martin, Petty and Rich, 2003; Peasnell, 1995; Grinyer, 1995).
Converting Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value (CSV) into the corresponding lost-capital
metric, one obtains a metric which is robustly goal congruent irrespective of the sign of the cash flows. The
CSV belongs to the class of standard residual income models. It is computed by picking ft=ECFt, bE,t:=Et
for every t≥1, and it=ket . In other words, market values are chosen as the equity’s book value (except at
time 0, when the usual initial condition bE,0:=f0 holds). Given that a1=(E1 + f1 − f0)/f0 (see Ferna´ndez,
2002, p. 281), and (owing to the choice of market values as book values) at=ket for t > 1, the resulting
residual income is
CSV1 = f0(a1 − ke1) = E1 + f1 − f0(1 + ke1) (42)
and
CSVt = Et−1(ket − ket) = 0 t > 1. (43)
In order to convert the standard CSV into its L companion, the capital charge ketbE,t−1 must be replaced
by ketb
∗
E,t−1 so that residual income becomes
L-CSV1 = f0(a1 − ke1) = E1 + f1 − f0(1 + ke1) (44)
and
L-CSVt = ket(Et−1 − b∗E,t−1) t > 1. (45)
It is noteworthy that
L-CSV1 =
(E1 + f1
1 + ke1
− f0
)
(1 + ke1) = NPV(1 + ke1).
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As for t > 1, remind that
Et =
n∑
j=t+1
fj
Fke(t, j)
,
where Fke(t, j) :=
∏j
h=t+1(1 + keh), and
b∗E,t =
n∑
j=t+1
fj
Fke(t, j)
+ b∗E,n
1
Fke(t, n)
.
Also,
b∗E,n = f0Fke(0, n)−
n∑
j=1
fjFke(j, n) = −NPV · Fke(0, n).
Therefore,
Et − b∗E,t = −b∗E,n
1
Fke(t, n)
= NPV · Fke(0, t)
whence
L-CSVt = ket(Et−1 − b∗E,t−1) = ket ·NPV · Fke(0, t−1).
This robust goal congruence holds, unlike Grinyer’s proposal, for any sequence of cash flows, with no restraint
on their sign.11 Note also that the L companion of CSV measures the increase of Net Present Value period
by period, because
ket ·NPV · Fke(0, t−1) = NPV · Fke(0, t)−NPV · Fke(0, t−1).
Egginton (1995) invokes a notion of periodic consistency for RI to be a legitimate tool for performance
appraisal and control. According to the author, a RI metric is said to enjoy periodic consistency if it
fulfills two requirements: (A) ex ante RIs should reflect the NPV ranking between different projects, so that
if project 1 has a higher NPV than project 2, the ex ante RIs of project 1 exceed those of project 2 in
every period (i.e. robust goal congruence must hold); (B) the ex ante RI sequence should be constant or
increasing, to prevent manager from adopting less profitable project with good early rewards. The author
finds a (standard) RI that fulfills both requirements for projects of equal life. He calls it the maintainable
RI. It is found by choosing an asset base so that residual income will be constant over years: solving∑n
t=1N · F (0, t)−1 =
∑n
t=1 ftF (0, t)
−1 − f0, the author finds N =
(∑n
t=1 ftF (0, t)
−1 − f0
)
/
∑n
t=1 F (0, t)
−1
(Egginton, 1995, eq. (17)). Charging depreciation as Dept(bt−1, bt) = ft −N − ibt−1 the book value for each
period is computed, and the resulting RI is xSt = ft − (ft − N − itbt−1) − ibt−1 = N , where N + itbt−1
represents income (Egginton, 1995, eqs. (18)-(19)). We may use the same approach and find that asset base
that guarantees constant L residual incomes. Solving ∑nt=1M · F (0, n)−1 = ∑nt=1 ftF (0, t)−1 − f0 we find
M = (
∑n
t=1 ftF (0, t)
−1−f0)/(n ·F (0, n)−1). Charging depreciation as Dept(b∗t−1, b∗t ) = ft−M− ib∗t−1, where
(M + ib∗t−1) is the income, one finds x
L
t = (M + itb
∗
t−1)− itb∗t−1 = M. It is worth noting that the depreciation
11If an entity approach is taken, rather than a proprietary approach, then L-CSV becomes Drukarczyk and Schu¨ler’s (2000)
Net Economic Income.
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charge selected is such that bt = bt−1 + M + ib∗t−1 which simply goes to bt = b
∗
t + tM for all t = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Hence, M is the arithmetic mean of the surplus of capital M = (bt − b∗t )/t for period. But Corollary 2
informs that, whatever the asset base, bt − b∗t =
∑t−1
k=1 x
L
k for all t. Picking t=n, we find
M =
1
n
n∑
k=1
xLk = x
L. (46)
In other words, if the book value depreciation is such that the surplus of capital is constant, then the resulting
RI is equal to the average residual income resulting from any book value depreciation. We name M this
measure maintainable RI, in analogy with Egginton’s. Obviously, if the L maintainable RI is scaled for time
it coincides with the time-scaled RI previously introduced. By Proposition 8, this time-scaled RI fulfills
both requirements (A) and (B), even for unequal-life projects. Actually, the reason is that, by scaling RIs,
a bundle of projects may be compared in terms of residual income as if the projects’ life were equal: it is as
if projects gave their respective owners constant (maintainable) RIs for the same length of time.
7 Conclusions
This paper aims at providing a theoretical foundation for a new notion of residual income, whose features
suggest a fruitful use in valuation, capital budgeting, performance measurement. Originally introduced with
the name of Systemic Value Added (Magni, 2000, 2001, 2003), the new paradigm translates the notion of
opportunity cost (capital charge) in a nonstandard way. The different capital charge derives from the fact
that account is taken not only of the return rate foregone by the investors, but also of the capital foregone
by the investors. In other words, if the investors invested in the alternative asset, they would own, at the
beginning of each period, a different capital than the actual one. This capital would generate additional
return at the opportunity cost of capital. By undertaking the project investors definitely lose this capital,
which is then “unrecovered”, as O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) put it.
This paper presents four theoretical frameworks that generate the paradigm: (i) an arbitrage-based
perspective whereby the project’s (firm’s) cash-flow stream may be replicated by investing funds at the cost
of capital; (ii) a microeconomic-based outlook, where the investors’ wealth is seen to evolve through time
depending on the course of action selected; (iii) an axiomatic approach where residual income is required
to equal investors’ excess wealth increase and be npv-consistent; (iv) an accounting approach based on two
alternative book value depreciation charges, one of which is the depreciation charge of Egginton’s (1995)
Adjusted RI and the other is any depreciation. In these four perspectives the capital charge is given different
(equivalent) meanings: it represents (i) interest on the short position of an arbitrage strategy, (ii) interest
on the investor’s alternative wealth, (iii) an additive-coherence-fulfilling opportunity cost, (iv) the sum of
the project’s cash flow and the depreciation for Adjusted RI.
Some important theoretical features are discussed alongside implications for valuation, capital budgeting,
performance measurement:
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• the lost-capital residual income enjoys an aggregation result: residual income are additively coherent in
the sense that their sum equals the project’s accumulated NPV. This implies that this paradigm tends
to offset forecasting errors: single periods do not count, only the average residual income is relevant for
valuation. Hence, to value an asset the fundamental step is to determine the future average residual
income (simple arithmetic mean). This result gives a quantitative foundation to Graham, Dodd, and
Cottle’s (1962) words: “Intrinsic value would then be found by first forecasting this earning power and
then multiplying that prediction by an appropriate ‘capitalization factor’” (p. 28)
• unlike the standard theory, the new theory allows one to give a significant role to accounting rates.
In particular, the weighted average of accounting rates, unanimously considered nonsignificant and
unhelpful for decision-making, turns out to be a reliable indicator of profitability. This average, which
is a Chisini (1929) mean, gives no problem of existence nor multiplicity and may well replace the IRR
rule: a project is worth undertaking if and only if the average accounting rate is greater than the
average comprehensive cost of capital, and the difference between the average ARR and the average
comprehensive cost of capital provides the same ranking as the NPV ranking. The simple average of
residual incomes may also be used for accept/reject decision and for ranking project of equal lives,
because the NPV is a multiple of the average residual income, which implies maximization of NPV is
equivalent of maximization of the average residual income. In case of unequal lives, it is possible to
make use of the time-scaled RI. These results gives accounting as a scientific discipline a major role
for capital budgeting decision-making
• periodic performance in the two theories differs in size and, possibly, in sign; the formal relations the
two residual incomes bear are condensed in a dual relation, which shows that either theory can be
generated by the other. Compensating managers with the new paradigm means that managers are
rewarded taking account of the entire return that would accrue to shareholders if funds were invested at
the cost of capital; that is, taking account that shareholders not only forego a return rate on the actual
capital, but they also forego an additional capital on which the cost of capital could be applied. This
implies that the new paradigm is a path-dependent residual income that keeps memory of the capital
lost by the investors. Quantitatively, this implies that the lost-capital paradigm tends to amplify
results with respect to the standard paradigm, both in positive and negative sense. For example, if the
αβ compensation plan is used (where bonus = α% RI+β%∆ RI), the lost-capital paradigm is more
incentive for positive-residual-income companies, because both residual income and its variations (∆ )
are greater in the lost-capital paradigm than in the standard one
• particular metrics can be generated in the lost-capital paradigm that are goal congruent: adopting
a proprietary approach, the lost-capital companion of Ferna´ndez’s (2002) Created Shareholder Value
is shown to enjoy robust goal congruence, irrespective of the sign of the cash flows; in this case,
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residual income does measure value creation. The average lost-capital income is shown to equal a
maintainable RI with specified book value depreciation such that the surplus of capital per period is
constant over time. The time-scaled RI (=maintainable RI) fulfills Egginton’s (1995) requirements of
periodic consistency.
The paper aims at attracting scholars’ interests for further investigations, both in a theoretical sense and
in an applicative sense. As for the latter, this work gives some specific clues for asset valuation and capital
budgeting decisions, and investigates the source of differences in performance measurement. It does not give
practical guides for incentive compensation, and future researches should be devoted to verifying whether
and how the paradigm may be specifically used for devising compensation plans capable of coping with the
principal-agent problem. It may well be the case that the search for a satisfying compensation plan will
lead to an index based on multiple metrics, possibly involving the use of both paradigms. Other important
situations may be coped with in the future, such as real options. It is widely known that the option value
may be computed via stochastic dynamic programming as a generalised NPV (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):
the procedure is formally equivalent to options pricing. Given the equivalence of NPV and the average
lost-capital RI, interesting results may be expected if the lost-capital theory is used for valuing a real option.
Acknowledgements. The author wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for fruitful remarks in the revision
process.
Appendix
Conversion is made by replacing the capital charge of the S theory with the comprehensive capital charge of the L
residual income. For illustrative purposes, we focus on Stewart’s (1991) Economic Value Added (EVA) and on the
Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model (Edwards and Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1995).12 The two metrics belong to the set
of standard residual income models, and are complementary: EVA adopts an entity (claimholders) approach; EBO
adopts a proprietary (shareholder) approach.
EVA
Assume that (i) the book value of the firm’s assets bA,t is chosen as the capital invested outstanding capital, (ii)
the free cash flows (FCF) are taken as the relevant cash flows (iii) the Return On Net Assets (RONA) is taken as
the accounting rate of return, and (iv) the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is taken as the opportunity
cost of capital. Then, clean surplus becomes
bA,t = bA,t−1 · (1 + RONAt)− FCFt
for t>0, and bA,0:=f0. Reminding that bA,t−1 · RONAt=NOPATt, the standard performance measure becomes
xSt = NOPATt −WACCt · bA,t−1. (47)
12Abusing notation, we will henceforth use the acronym EBO to refer to the corresponding residual income as well.
27
If, instead, theory L is applied, one gets
b∗A,t = b
∗
A,t−1 · (1 + WACCt)− FCFt
for t>0, with b∗A,0:=f0 and b
∗
A,t is the lost capital. Thus, the lost-capital metric is
xLt = NOPATt −WACCt · b∗A,t−1. (48)
The metrics in eqs. (47) and (48) represent the original Economic Value Added and its lost-capital companion,
respectively.
EBO
A different metric is generated when (i) the book value of equity bE,t is taken as the outstanding capital, (ii)
the equity cash flows (ECF) are taken as the relevant cash flows, (iii) the Return On Equity (ROE) is taken as the
periodic rate of return, and (iv) the cost of equity (ke) is taken as the opportunity cost of capital. We have
bE,t = bE,t−1 · (1 + ROEt)− ECFt
for t>0, with bE,0:=f0. Therefore, reminding that bE,t−1 · ROEt=PATt, the standard measure becomes
xSt = PATt − ket · bE,t−1. (49)
If one applies theory L, one gets
b∗E,t = b
∗
E,t−1 · (1 + ket)− ECFt
for t > 0, with b∗E,0 := f0. Thus, the lost-capital measure results in
xLt = PATt − ket · b∗E,t−1. (50)
The metrics in eqs. (49) and (50) represent EBO as originally conceived and its lost-capital companion, respectively
(see Table 5).
We apply the two paradigms to a firm created to undertake a project that requires an initial investment of 13 800,
of which 12 000 are spent in fixed assets and 1 800 in working capital requirements. Straight-line depreciation is
assumed for the fixed assets. It is also assumed that the required return on assets is 12% and the book value of debt
equals the market value of debt (i.e. debt rate=required return to debt). Other input data are collected in Table
6; Table 7 gives the firm’s accounting statements and the resulting cash flows, and Table 8 focusses on equity and
firm valuation. The market value of equity is first found by using three different discounted-cash-flow methods: the
Adjusted Present Value (APV) method, introduced by Myers (1974), the ECF-ke method (equity approach), and the
FCF-WACC method (entity approach). Logically, they all give the same result (see Ferna´ndez, 2002).
Afterwards, a residual-income perspective is used to obtain the market value: Tables 9-13 show the application
of the two paradigms to the EVA model and the EBO model. Obviously, both residual income paradigms supply
the same market values as the discounted-cash-flow technique’s and the same NPV. The average RI (=maintain-
abale RI) is also computed for each case: it is positive in both equity and entity perspective (see Tables 9-10),
consistently with the NPV. Value creation is also signalled by the average ARR, which is contrasted with the com-
prehensive cost of equity: the average ROE is 27.47%, which is greater than the average comprehensive cost of equity:
28
(
∑5
t=1 ketb
∗
E,t−1/
∑5
t=1 bE,t−1) = 10.86%. The difference between the two rates is 16.61; applying it to the total book
value
∑5
t=1 bE,t−1=25000 and discounting to time 0 one gets back the NPV.
The examples show a situation of positive EVAs and EBOs in each period. First of all, note that in the first period
the two paradigms give the same answer, because the initial capital invested is the same (b0 = b
∗
0). In the next periods,
the lost-capital metrics are constantly greater than the standard metrics. Also, the periodic variation in the lost-
capital metrics are greater. For example, in Table 9 the standard EVA’s variations are given by (281, 282, 283, 286),
the lost-capital EVA’s variations are (282, 313, 347, 376). In Table 10 we have, consistently, that the EBO’s variations
are (296, 298, 306, 372) and (302, 350, 427, 811), respectively.
As anticipated, the L residual income has an insurance component for negative situations. Suppose the fourth-year
sales amount to 8 000 instead of 10 000 (Table 11), other things equal. Both paradigms report negative performance
in the fourth year.13 Yet, the lost-capital paradigm smoothes the negativeness, because it takes account of the fact
that the past year’s results were better, which implies that the lost capital at the beginning of the fourth year is
smaller than the actual capital employed: bA,3 > b
∗
A,3 and bE,3 > b
∗
E,3. It is easy to see that if the fourth-year sales
are equal to 8 600 instead of 10 000 (other things unvaried), the corresponding S metrics become negative, whereas
the L metrics keep positive (Table 12). In this case, while the RONA (respectively, ROE) is indeed smaller than
the WACC (respectively, ke) in the fourth year, the bonus given by the additional amount WACC4·(bA,3 − b∗A,3)=96
(respectively, ke4 ·(bE,3− b∗E,3)=185) is so high as to more than compensate the negative standard EVA (respectively,
EBO): we have 16=−80+96, and 164=−21+185.
Evidently, the bonus may symmetrically act a penalty role if past performance is negative. For example, consider
the case where in the third year sales amount to 8 000 (other things unvaried). This makes the third-year residual
incomes negative for both paradigms (Table 13). Due to insurance bonus for positive past performances, the lost-
capital residual incomes are less negative than the standard ones. Yet, the third-year negative performance penalizes
the fourth-year performance, which is smaller than that reported by the standard residual incomes. Note that in
the fifth year, performance recorded by the L paradigm is again higher than the standard one’s, due to the renewed
recent positive performance of the fourth year. In other words, as compared to the S metric, performance is amplified
in negative and in positive sense (bonus and penalty roles).
If maintainable RI is used, performance is always positive, consistently with the sign of the NPV. This means
that the surplus of capital invested per period is constant and equal to the maintainable RI (which is in turn equal
to the average RI). Table 10 tells us that the L maintainable RI is 830.6: it is greater than 464.2, which is found
in Table 11; this means that (profitability) and performance diminishes (this is obvious, given that Table 11 refers
to the case of fourth-year sales equal to 8000.). Analogously, the case treated in Table 12 is halfway between the
former two. Table 13 deals with the case where third-year sales are equal to 8000<10000; the maintainable RI is
412.2, which means that the NPV will be smaller than the case described in Table 11 (fourth-year sales equal to
8000). This is intuitive: while the total sales over the time span [0,5] coincide, the distribution of income in Table 11
is more favourable; which implies that the NPV will be greater than Table 13’s.
13The reader should not be discomforted by the fact that each period’s residual income changes. If one period’s sales change,
the corresponding ECF and FCF change, so that the market value of equity is changed in every year, which implies that both
ke and WACC change in every year, which in turn induces a change in the capital charge of every period.
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Table 0. Main notational conventions
at, ~a accounting rate (scalar and vector)
a average accounting rate of return
ARR accounting rate of return
bt book value
b simple arithmetic mean of book values
b∗t lost, unrecovered capital
bA,t total capital invested (book value)
b∗A,t total lost capital
bE,t equity (book value)
b∗E,t lost equity
bj,t book value of project j
Ct capital charge
CSV Created Shareholder Value
D debt (market value=book value)
Dept depreciation charge
DVTS discounted value of tax shields
∆ variation
E equity (market value)
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
EBO Edwards-Bell-Ohlson
ECF Equity Cash Flow
EI expected residual-income improvement
EVA Economic Value Added
f firm, project
ft, ~f cash flow (scalar, vector)
F (s, t) accumulation factor from s to t
FCF Free Cash Flow
Γ arbitrage gain at time n
it, opportunity cost of capital
i∗t comprehensive cost of capital
ι∗ average comprehensive cost of capital
I0,t excess wealth increase generated in the span [0, t]
kD required return on debt (=debt rate)
ke cost of equity
kU required return on assets
(The Table is continued on the next page)
Table 0. (continued) Notational Conventions
L lost-capital
M maintainable
nj project’s j length
NOPAT Net Operating Profit After Taxes
NPV Net Present Value
PAT Profit After Taxes
PBT Profit Before Taxes
PV[A; B]
∑n
t=1
At∏t
k=1(1+Bk)
r, ~r internal rate of return, internal return vector
RI residual income
S standard
ROA, RONA, ROE Return On Assets, Return On Net Assets, Return On Equity
T corporate tax rate
v0 market value of project/firm f
vt0 market value of a t-period asset
VU value of the unlevered firm
W0 investor’s wealth at time 0
Wt(~ι) investor’s wealth at time t if economic activity f is undertaken
Wt(~b, ~f,~ι) investor’s wealth at time t economic activity f is not undertaken
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital
WCR Working Capital Requirements
xt income
xRt residual income (general)
xSt residual income (standard)
xLt residual income (lost capital)
xLt simple arithmetic mean of L residual incomes
Table 1. Arbitrage strategy
Cash flows
Time 0 1 2 . . . n
Investment on p −f0 f1 f2 . . . fn
Short position on p p0 −f1 −f2 . . . −fn
Long position on p −(p0 − f0) 0 0 . . . Γ
Total 0 0 0 . . . Γ
Table 2. Arbitrage strategy: netting out positions on p
Cash flows
Time 0 1 2 · · · n
Investment in f −f0 f1 f2 · · · fn
Net short position on p f0 −f1 −f2 · · · −(fn − Γ)
Total 0 0 0 . . . Γ
Table 3. The residual-income framework and the axiomatic approach
Residual income Definition 1 Property 1 Axiom 1 Axiom 1’
General X X
Lost-capital X X X
Standard X X X
Table 4. The economic derivations of lost-capital residual income
financial
return from long position︷ ︸︸ ︷
atbt−1
interest on short position (lost return)︷ ︸︸ ︷
itb
∗
t−1
microeconomic
wealth increase︷ ︸︸ ︷
Wt(xt,~ι)−Wt−1(xt,~ι)
lost wealth increase︷ ︸︸ ︷
Wt(~ι)−Wt−1(~ι)
accounting
depreciation of Adjusted RI︷ ︸︸ ︷
Dept(b
∗
t−1, b
∗
t )
any depreciation︷ ︸︸ ︷
Dept(bt−1, bt)
Table 5. EVA and EBO variables in the two paradigms
at it bt b
∗
t =⇒ capital charge
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Standard Paradigm
EVA RONA WACC bA,t =⇒ WACCt· bA,t−1
EBO ROE ke bE,t =⇒ ket · bE,t−1
Lost-capital Paradigm
EVA RONA WACC b∗A,t b
∗
A,t =⇒ WACCt · b∗A,t−1
EBO ROE ke bE,t b
∗
E,t =⇒ ket · b∗A,t−1
Table 6. Input data
Investment 13 800 Depreciation rate 20%
Gross Fixed Assets 12 000 Corporate tax rate 33%
WCR 1 800 Required return on assets 12%
Sales 10 000 Debt rate 7%
Cost of Sales 3 670 Required return on debt (kD) 7%
Gen. & Admin. Expenses 1 600
Debt 4 000
Table 7. Balance Sheet, Income Statement, Cash Flows
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
BALANCE SHEET
Gross fixed assets 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000
−cumulative depreciation 0 −2 400 −4 800 −7 200 −9 600 −12 000
Net fixed assets 12 000 9 600 7 200 4 800 2 400 0
WCR 1 800 1 800 1 800 1 800 1 800 0
NET ASSETS 13 800 11 400 9 000 6 600 4 200 0
Debt 4 000 4 000 4 000 4 000 4 000 0
Equity (book value) 9 800 7 400 5 000 2 600 200 0
NET WORTH & LIABILITIES 13 800 11 400 9 000 6 600 4 200 0
INCOME STATEMENT
Sales 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000
Cost of sales 3 670 3 670 3 670 3 670 3 670
Gen. & Adm. expenses 1 600 1 600 1 600 1 600 1 600
Depreciation 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400
EBIT 2 330 2 330 2 330 2 330 2 330
Interest 280 280 280 280 280
PBT 2 050 2 050 2 050 2 050 2 050
Taxes 677 677 677 677 677
PAT 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374
+Depreciation 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400
+∆ Debt 0 0 0 0 −4 000
−∆ WCR 0 0 0 0 1 800
ECF 3 774 3 774 3 774 3 774 1 574
FCF14 3 961 3 961 3 961 3 961 5 761
ROE 14.02% 18.56% 27.47% 52.83% 686.75%
Average ROE 27.47%
14FCF=ECF−∆D + kDD · (1− T ).
Table 8. Valuation
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
kU 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
VU=PV[FCF; kU ] 15 300 13 175 10 795 8 129 5 144 0
DVTS=PV[T·kD·D; kD](a) 379 313 242 167 86 0
v=VU+DVTS 15 679 13 488 11 038 8 296 5 230 0
E=VU+DVTS−D 11679 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
ke 13.550% 13.943% 14.670% 16.461% 27.907%
E=PV[ECF; ke] 11679 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
average (comprehensive) cost of equity 10.86%
WACC 11.290% 11.199% 11.053% 10.786% 10.151%
v=PV[FCF; WACC] 15 679 13 488 11 038 8 296 5 230 0
E=v−D 11679 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
NPV=E−bE 1 879
(a)We use kD to discount tax shields. However, it is worth noting that there is a lively debate in the literature on
which is the correct discount rate for discounting tax shields. While this issue is not relevant to this paper, the reader
may be willing to turn to the contributions of Myers (1974), Tham and Ve´lez-Pareja (2001), Arzac and Glosten
(2005), Ferna´ndez (2005), Cooper and Nyborg (2006). (To bypass the issue, the reader may well dismiss the first five
rows of the Table and consider ke as exogenously given).
Table 9. EVA in the two paradigms
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
NOPAT=EBIT·(1−T ) 1 561 1 561 1 561 1 561 1 561
bA=D+bE 13 800 11 400 9 000 6 600 4 200 0
b∗A (lost capital) 13 800 11 397 8 712 5 714 2 369 −3 151
Standard Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 558 1 277 995 712 426
EVA 3 284 566 849 1135
NPV (=discount and sum) 1 879
E=bE+NPV 11 679
Lost-capital Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 558 1 276 963 616 240
EVA 3 285 598 945 1321
NPV (=sum and discount) 1 879
E=bE+NPV 11 679
average RI (maintainable RI) 603.4 603.4 603.4 603.4 603.4
Table 10. EBO in the two paradigms
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
PAT 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374 1 374
bE 9 800 7 400 5 000 2 600 200 0
b∗E (lost equity capital) 9 800 7 354 4 606 1 509 −2 017 −4 153
Standard Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 328 1 032 733 428 56
EBO 46 342 640 946 1318
NPV (=discount and sum) 1 879
E=bE+NPV 11 679
Lost-capital Paradigm
capital charge (opportunity cost) 1 328 1 025 676 248 −563
EBO 46 348 698 1125 1936
NPV (=sum and discount) 1 879
E=bE+NPV 11 679
average RI (maintainable RI) 830.6 830.6 830.6 830.6 830.6
Table 11. Fourth-year sales equal to 8000
year 1 2 3 4 5
EVA
Standard Paradigm 9 291 575 −477 1135
Lost-capital paradigm 9 292 608 −381 1188
average RI (maintainable RI) 343.2 343.2 343.2 343.2 343.2
EBO
Standard Paradigm 34 326 616 −439 1318
Lost-capital paradigm 34 330 671 −251 1537
average RI (maintainable RI) 464.2 464.2 464.2 464.2 464.2
Table 12. Fourth-year sales equal to 8600
year 1 2 3 4 5
EVA
Standard Paradigm 7 289 573 −80 1135
Lost-capital paradigm 7 290 605 16 1228
average RI (maintainable RI) 429.2 429.2 429.2 429.2 429.2
EBO
Standard Paradigm 37 331 624 −21 1318
Lost-capital paradigm 37 336 680 164 1658
average RI (maintainable RI) 575 575 575 575 575
Table 13. Third-year sales equal to 8000
year 1 2 3 4 5
EVA
Standard Paradigm 9 292 −763 849 1135
Lost-capital paradigm 9 293 −730 803 1173
average RI (maintainable RI) 309.6 309.6 309.6 309.6 309.6
EBO
Standard Paradigm 32 323 −727 946 1318
Lost-capital paradigm 32 328 −673 894 1480
average RI (maintainable RI) 412.2 412.2 412.2 412.2 412.2
Table 14. CSV in the two paradigms
time 0 1 2 3 4 5
outstanding capital 9 800 9 488 7 038 4 296 1 230 0
lost equity capital 9 800 7 354 4 606 1 509 −2 017 −4 153
Standard Paradigm
CSV 2134 0 0 0 0
NPV (=discount and sum) 1 879
E=bE+NPV 11 679
Lost-capital Paradigm
CSV 2134 298 357 459 906
NPV (=sum and discount) 1 879
E=bE+NPV 11 679
